"Police officer who doesn't kill, is not a police officer[1]": (in)security practices in Brazil

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Abstract
This paper aims to propose a theoretical exercise about the relation between the high rates of deaths by murder of young people and security policies in Brazil currently. The basic argument outlines how the production of security is embedded in even more insecurities, governing, marginalizing and literally erasing undesired individuals from society. This security trap occurs in practices that are legitimized because of the authority positioned in the field, and enters in exceptionality expressions of the law when the sovereignty over life is conducted, as the "term of resistance" (*auto de resistência*). In this sense, we want to use the School of Paris to analyse in which way more security (or more security apparatus) means after all more insecurities; in other words, the political technique behind increasing the means of security forces results in escalating and spirals of violence of those who they should protect.

Keywords: Violence, State of Exception, Brazilian public security.

Which security? Exception and the normality/practices of (in)security

Under the paradigm of control and authority, violence must be an object of study of Security, where threats, protection and survival are deeply rooted in the explanation and scripture of the International/Domestic relations (Campbell, 1992). On the one hand, the monopoly of violence implicates in less war and conflict (the internal pacification and more "security") as to traditional approaches; on the other hand, this monopoly never fully guaranteed security for all (Foucault, Em Defesa da Sociedade, 2005; 2008). This effort resulted in the opening of the "black box" of statecraft, as one can see with the politics of security (Fierke, 2007). These security practices themselves violate their own citizens – not the presumably Wight's inference that the international was the kingdom of violence and insecurity (Wight, 1960). Indeed, what begins to be scrutinized are the practices of exclusion and violence perpetrated by the state, inverting the (neo)realist perception on the anarchic system as the source of insecurity (Krause and Williams, 1997: 44). Moreover, Krause and Williams argue that the naturalization of violent practices by states are at the same time an issue to security and a source for political legitimization, authorization and alterity. The citizenship becomes a source of insecurity, as the very possibility to be violated by the state (*idem*).

The so-called process of widening and deepening (or vertical and horizontal opening) of Security Studies was an important achievement in this sub-area of International Relations. Those engaged in this movement understood that the traditional approaches to Security did not pose answers to their questions, namely after the end of the Cold War (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). The State, now, was the same entity that permeated violent predictions and was supposed to guarantee the citizen's life. Violence is central to this debate. We are not saying that, in our case-study, the youth dies only because of this artifice; rather, there is a political system that is

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a *continuum* of violence which is not reducible neither to the peace[2], nor to post-conflict violence. The newest wars are based on three assumptions: the ostensive use of small arms to control territories; the hyper-concentration of armed violence happens also in contexts of formal Peace, namely in urban areas of the global south; and, finally, the war system that prevails and legitimizes this type of violence is pervasive in all sectors of our lives (Moura, 2010: 44-45). What is important to retain is that, in Brazil, for example, the urban space is characterized by its clear cleavage between different social classes and quality of life and, surely, by the source of the rule of law.

So, we must make sense of the securitization process followed by agents in the field of security. In order to achieve and comprehend their practices, we have to bring the approach from the "Paris School". The CASE collective (2006) advance is a critic of the securitization and emancipation theory. To unmake securitization, one needs to engage in the politics of normality and the politics as normativity; the first as de-securitization and the other as emancipation. The discussion on the concept is to identify whether security is constitutive of the normality, a struggle over the forms of exclusion and marginalization. Then the normality is a technology of ordering and managing social problems, in which the security professionals base their action. Although the police forces are incorporated by state government and functions as an executive stance, every discussion on their procedures or their discipline while (un)protecting civilians are pushed to the bureaucratic curtains of the office of police investigations and they claim to work for and by society whereas being at the heart of the field of power (Bigo, 2008: 27). It is through policing the insecurity that one can address what is fear and threat, and the consideration that the professional networks of agents can manage the truth about security and what is risk and threat. It is a constitutive ordering of the field of security, built as the ground of authorization and definition of the meaning of security: "focus on the networks of professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive power of their practices" (C.A.S.E Collective , 2006: 458).

Constituting the security apparatus into a field, we must understand this as a space of struggle and domination. In this case, the professionals engaged in the security field in Brazil, namely the police[3], exercise their power on the production of security as a constant battle – and as said about their military nature, is important to stress their social roles as defenders of society – where armed conflict can be produced anytime; further dissonant voices (on demilitarizing police or to bring transparency to its chain of command) are frequently dismissed and avoided. So, the clear outcome is that to achieve more "security" as decreasing murders, the police are enrolled in the increasing of murders, as a spiral of violence that constantly produces combatants and bodies that must die. As explicitly posed in our title, the political advice/control over police corps is to engage them in more and more insecurity practices. The very possibility to be killed in police operations constitutes a permanent state of emergency, when some special laws become the bearer of the permanent state of emergency (Bigo, 2008). Here, we must underline a substantive problem that operates in modern societies. In the critical tradition, violence is deeply rooted in the creation and operation of positive law and the legitimization on the use of force. Walter Benjamin (1985) exposes in the *Critique of Violence*, how the constituency of every law is based on a mythical violence that operates always in the state of exception.

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[2] By this term, we understand the distinction comprised by Galtung´s (1969) definition of positive/negative peace.
[3] And in a spill over the army, the Federal Police, Road Federal Police, State Military and Civil Polices, and their several special groups.

This exceptionalist experience is no way isolated as well as it has effect towards a specific group of society. It is not a fate of individual choices or some dysfunctional action in political communities. The production of dying bodies, of "bare life" is, then, as showed by Giorgio Agamben, an instrument of the *tanatopolitics*, the very possibility of the politicization of life – and death – through the decision of the sovereign on who deserves to die. The subjection of the bodies into a political ordering of this bare life is the great narrative of Hobbes' Leviathan, turning the bodies into entities that are subject to sovereign killing (Agamben, 2007: 131). Furthermore, the state of exception, on its *tanatopolitics,* is an expansible project that dislocates each more to the borders of the social life, not anymore isolated in the fields: when the sovereign converges himself as a doctor, scientist (Agamben, 2007: 128), or in our case as the police. This is the critical link with the very possibility of the bare life of black young people in Brazil and the production of (in)security practices. The professionals, enrolled in the later, are embedded in the security field, legitimizing and being legitimized, through politics of violence normalization. The Clausewitzan maxim inverted by Foucault (2005), makes all the sense here when we think that the pacification of society is enabled by the erasure of unauthorized bodies to live.

Situating the violence problem

A vast body of literature discusses the situation of violence and security in Brazil, especially about the biggest cities and state capitals. Accordingly, Brazil lives in an epidemic[4] situation of violence where high rates of homicide are pervasive in society in relative and absolute numbers. Although these numbers show some critical situations, even when compared to countries that are engaged in civil wars and conflicts, there are some patterns that must be detached – and is part of our aim with this paper – in order to clarify arguments on how insecurity structures are organized in Brazilian society. In a simple comparison, during Iraq War, approximately 268.000 people died from 2003-persent, also in Syria something between 330.000 and 475.000[5]. This fact challenges traditional approaches to Security in the sense that the war discourse is itself a threat and danger to lives in pacific spaces through normalizations and assumption of a specific societal order[6].

As can be seen in table 1, the absolute number of deaths by murder has been increasing since 2005 (with some isolated decreasing) summing up almost 600.000 deaths. Additionally, the relative rate of murders increases by the same way, as showed in line 2, what unveils the naturalization of this phenomena in relation to the many spheres of government by the public security, bringing implications to health, demography and social and economic development (Ipea and FBSP, 2017).

Table 1: Deaths by murder

Years	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total of murders	48136	49704	48219	50659	52043	53016	52807	57045	57396	60474	59080
Rate of murders by 100 thousand	26,1	26,6	25,5	26,7	27,2	27,8	27,4	29,4	28,6	29,8	28,9

Source: (Ipea and FBSP, 2017)

However, these numbers do not show an arbitrary distribution of deaths. As one can say, these bodies have age and race, and mostly an address. Giving identity to them is a process to

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[4] Actually, UN considers that murders happen in an epidemic basis when it reaches more than 10 cases by 100.000 in the population (United Nations Development Program, 2013).

[5] (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2017) and (Conflict Casualties Monitor, 2017).

[6] Recently, a popular newspaper in Rio de Janeiro, "Jornal Extra", created a specific editorial to take in account the Rio's War, arousing several critics from academics, where all news about security/police/drug trafficking issues addressed as episodes of this war: (Jornal Extra, 2017).

recognize its social and political status. According to the available data, they are likely to happen with young poor people presenting a trend that is linked to how violence is pervasive in this type of group and social class. As presented below, at table 2, between the ages of 15 to 29 more than 40% of the deaths are by murdering.

Table 2: Deaths by murder by age

Age	10 to 14 yo	15 to 19 yo	20 to 24 yo	25 to 29 yo	30 to 34 yo	35 to 39 yo
Male	17,5%	53,8%	49,9%	40,8%	31,5%	21,6%
Female	6,1%	14,9%	13,0%	10,6%	8,0%	5,1%
Total	13,2%	46,8%	43,7%	34,6%	25,4%	16,6%

Source: (Ipea and FBSP, 2017)

The data is even worse, when we segregate it by race: the deaths by murder by age and by race signalizes that who most die in this situation are black male young. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, a black person represents 78,9% of those who have the 10% with more chance to be killed. This complies with direct and structural violence (Galtung, 1969) and takes part in an (in)security politics that involves all society. Looking to this data in isolation, we get in a situation that "Young and black males keep being murdered every year as they were in a war situation" (Ipea and FBSP, 2017: 32). The great node to be unfastened is the participation of registered deaths by police action, which shows an extremely high rate when compared with police action worldwide. Considering that some state police departments are less transparent and simply do not divulgate their data, these numbers are surely underestimated. In the last two years of available data, they killed more than six thousand people:

Table 3: Deaths occurred by police action

	2014	2015
Total of murders	3146	3320

Source: (Ipea and FBSP, 2017)

Addressing this situation – in a lately way, we must express –, in 2016, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI), presided by Senator Lindbergh Farias, after listening to various experts and families of black young victims, stated that was in course, in Brazil, a genocide of black population. Drawing from the dismiss of the called racial democracy in Brazil, the CPI was active in denouncing the range of racist conditions in Brazil, through institutions, education, economy and culture that finally authorize violence against a specific social group (Farias, 2016: 33). The problem of the link between the structural conditions and process on this are "[…]the focus on upper case Genocide [that] often entails a focus on outcomes rather than causes and processes that may or may not produce the mass killing which many think is the substance of genocide" (Bloxham and Moses, 2010). It is utterly important the recognition and discursive use to draw attention to their claims, where there is a violent action perpetrated by police, a cascade of legitimization and power relations are presumed in police routines and operationalization.

(In)security practices: some points to unveil the security field in Brazil
As follows, the CPI mentioned above advances in denouncing the deaths elapsing during police operations whereas conducted by government servicers disposable of the violence monopoly. Concentrating on this issue, we can visibly face it as a politics of security and understand this phenomenon as a technic of government. The police forces are used to apply an exceptional procedure to enforce a regular law: the term of resistance (*auto de resistência*) that is the authorization of the use of force – that concludes in the death of the supposed criminal – in order to resist an opposing attack which could result in the life-risk situation. It is, then,

supposed to be performed concerning the defence, not attack, whereas is supported by the police self-testimony. However, it is widely used to hide police murders in situations that the criminals were already surrendered, what can be verified by the shooting location: a substantial characteristic are the shots at the back of the neck (Magalhães and Magalhães, 2016).

Michel Misse (2010) underlines a condition in the juridical order in Brazil that only happens there: the police is responsible itself to conduct the investigation (as an impartial entity) and to decide to carry it to Justice (as a partial entity). Hence, the practice of naming deaths as "autos de resistência" so intrinsically an exceptionalism inside the same law register, as itself rarely advances as a criminal act, and is solved among the police officers[7]. Brazilian Constitution does not comprise the death penalty, and the murder constitutes a crime in the Penal Code[8], then, it is not a singularity the routinized use of this procedure. It embraces much more relations than fire confrontation.

Alongside the term of resistance, the forced disappearance is also an act of normalization of the erasure of undesired bodies. Fábio Alves Araújo highlights that despite the Brazilian dictatorship has been acknowledged for the practice of kidnapping and murdering, it did not cease and during the last years it has been produced as a language of urban violence (Araújo, 2016: 47). As the author noticed in his fieldwork, as if "there is no body, there is no crime" the police engages in profiling cases that comes to as archetypes of self-fulfilling deaths: the reputation of the victims, their family and where they live are important in the definition of who deserves an investigation or not. The police practice, then, obliterates the rule of law while participation of police officers is evident, themselves become a corporativist barrier to investigation and punishment (*idem*: 40). Once more, the body politics is central to the technique of government.

A famous case in Rio de Janeiro makes explicit this logic, when the disappearance and terms of resistance come together. The "Caso Juan" happened in 2011 when one adult man and one young man were attacked by police and testified how the police officers got away with Juan's body (Eilbaum and Medeiros, 2015: 410). Only after the case appeared in traditional media and after 16 days, Juan came to mortuary institution. So, the question transformed from Where is Juan to Who killed Juan? During the trial Eilbaum and Medeiros alert to a huge fact that was kept untold, the amount of terms of resistance in police officer's "cv", closely 40 cases. In this sense, a contesting discourse appears in the direction of destabilization of Human Rights standpoints – as one of the many illiberal practices of Liberalism (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008) – , whereas Brazilian 1988 Constitution is commonly grounded. In an interview with a police officer Silva Leandro and Figueira present the dichotomization of the subject of rights: the defence of "human rights for right humans" or a common sense of deliberate choice of whom deserve to be ruled by law and basic rights (2014: 274). Then, the categorization and the process of classification of the dead body into the bandit – or who deserves to die by the sovereign power – is seen as a natural way, legitimized, tolerated and even desired. As is remembered, there are many trying in disciplining the police action. However, the control and accountability over police is always lost and weakened.

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[7] It is important to stress the Brazilian peculiarity of public security: there are two police corps. The Military Police is who effectively are at streets promoting the law enforcement and policing the public spaces. As militaries, they engage in hierarchical positions and entails in barracks practices as administrative prisons and a different juridical status than others public servicers. The other corps is the Civil Police, which is responsible for the investigation on crimes and to deliver the denounce pieces to Justice. Generally, they don't normally engage in shooting and don't use a specific uniform as well. Their relationship may be often a competitive one, but both are involved in a "bureaucratic-military ethos" as a security apparatus, defending themselves.
[8] Article 121 of Brazilian Penal Code (Brazil, 1940).

Conclusion

In conclusion, we return to our title, when is politically possible to address that statement without any remorse or coercion by justice burying any optimistic vision emerged after a long period of dictatorship in Brazil. The productive nexus of the technique of government could be analysed through an extensive debate in Brazilian academia around public security policies and violence. Another conclusion must be addressed, to comprehend the phenomena of erasure of undesired bodies as a continuous process of the sovereign power in determining and extending the control of deaths in the fringes of the political community; it is over there that violence clashes more vigorously without visibility and denounces. However, some issues remain unexplored.

To understand the positive relationship between security and exceptionalism only opens the field in considering broader constitutive practices which at first glance are completely distant from each other and are seen as dichotomized. Some more emphasis can be put, for example, in the discursive practice of the war on drugs – as some pattern in Latin America – and how it operates similarly, marginalizing and excluding social classes and perpetrating the control over life and death. Finally, some fieldwork must be done in a longitudinal analysis of the field of security mediating the capital accumulation between police officers, politicians and so-called "security consultants" that multiplies while many spaces of the cities have their security privatized.

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